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Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture

BENJAMIN ZYLA

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With the Cold War's end, the debate on the future of Europe's security policy has largely centred on three issues: 1) strengthening the European Union's security and defence policy; 2) generating more military capabilities; and 3) facilitating intra-institutional cooperation between the security institutions in Europe.[1] Here, we will focus on the third dimension and examine more closely the inter-institutional relationship between the two leading security organizations in Europe, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

The history of NATO–EU relations is complex and deeply embedded in the two security actors' role-finding process in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. More precisely, at the heart of that quest for organizational identity is NATO's search for a security role for its European members. While the European Union member states were an integral part of American grand strategy during the Cold War, they acquired an increasingly autonomous standing and role in European security in the post-Cold War era. Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty the European Union began to think about not only its place and role in the world but also the appropriate means by which to carry out such roles (such as the Petersberg Tasks).

Much ink has already been spilled tracing the evolution of the relationship between the two organizations.[2] In the 1990s, it was particularly cultivated by the George H. Bush administration, which requested that Europe share a greater slice of the Atlantic burden[3] and increase its contribution to regional security in Europe by way of creating a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).[4] This arrangement under ESDI took place inside NATO and essentially allowed European forces to borrow American military assets to conduct crisis management missions in Europe's immediate neighborhood. In turn, US forces in Europe benefited from this arrangement by being freed from some of their non-Article 5 responsibilities.

The ESDI principle was formally agreed upon at the NATO Council in Berlin in 1996, and became known as the 'Berlin-Plus' agreement. Negotiations on the complicated and contested details of the agreement lasted until December 2002 where an institutionalized and strategic partnership between the two organizations was finalized.[5] In light of the crisis in the Balkans and the explicit American discontent about Europe's weakening military capabilities, the St Malo Summit in 1999 set in motion the creation of an autonomous EU security and defence policy (ESDP) outside of NATO.[6] While the summit established the European Union as an independent global actor, it immediately raised conceptual and practical questions about future relations between the EU and NATO. At the kernel of the dispute rests the involvement of non-EU NATO members (such as Turkey and Norway) in intra-European

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security affairs, as the Berlin-Plus arrangement offered no venue for those states to be fully involved in such. It also left the 'right of first refusal' principle of NATO largely unspecified.

To be sure, this historical account is not new at all.[7] Moreover, the body of literature is mostly descriptive rather than analytical, and only recently have researchers begun to explore the relationship between the two organizations by bringing the issue into the realm of the discipline of international relations.[8]

Against this backdrop, it is therefore hardly sensible, and possibly even redundant, to write another piece that traces the complex and interwoven relationship between the two organizations. Rather than studying their material overlaps I take a different approach to studying strategic cultures and examine the ideational structures that affect the institutions' social behaviour, as well as their behaviour toward each other. Inspired by the concept of a strategic culture[9] I conceptualize strategic cultures as elite expressions of strategic beliefs, values, and norms. The objective of this research article then is twofold: first, to tease out how structures of meaning in the form of norms, values, and beliefs have affected the behaviour of those two organizations toward each other; and second, to introduce a new exploratory argument of a subcultural relationship of the two organizations that can help explain their attitudinal divergences.

In order to make my argument, I will unpack the prevalent strategic cultures of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into their normative, ideational, and behavioural components. In so doing, I will cluster them according to 1. the meanings they assign to future challenges and threats; 2. the behavioural prepositions of how to respond to those threats; and 3. the preferred modes of international cooperation.

I provide two arguments. First, there is a significant normative overlap between the two institutions, especially with regard to future challenges and threats, as well as the role of third parties and international organizations. Yet there exists an elementary difference in terms of the values the institutions attach to the use of force, the sanctioned range and type of missions, and the resources justified to carry them out. Because of the limitations regarding the scope and length of this study, the empirical section can only provide a snapshot of potentially larger ideational forces at play. Second, by building on of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's works on political culture, I argue that the best way to map out the social world and to make sense of the ideational divergences of the two organizations is to conceptualize NATO's strategic culture as a subculture of the European Union. That is to say that NATO's strategic culture in the 1990s has become a subcultural trait of shared and distinctive sets of values, norms, and beliefs that are different from those held at the EU level.[10] This section of the paper should be understood as a bold exploratory attempt to better conceptualize the attitudinal divergence of the two organizations under the cultural framework.

The article starts by briefly outlining the methodology used for the empirical part. What follows is a historical review of the concept of strategic culture. This will help us to appreciate the salience of the concept as well as the contribution that this article makes to the literature. In the third section, I define the concept of norms before

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explaining the nexus between a strategic culture and a security strategy/strategic document. The empirical part concentrates on an examination of the three normative clusters as mentioned above. The fourth section explores ways of conceptually explaining the attitudinal divergence of the two organizations by introducing the concept of subcultures to the study of EU–NATO relations. This section should be understood as an exploratory undertaking to explain the institutional overlap.

Methodology

Before we compare the European Union's and NATO's strategic culture across their normative and behavioural values, it is important to elucidate the methodologies employed in this study. To reiterate, the objective of this study is to tease out how structures of meaning in the form of norms, values, and beliefs affected those two organizations' behaviour towards each other between 2003 and 2010.[11] The principal challenge thus lies in how to delineate those organizations' strategic cultures and measure their non-material variables without running a tautological argument. Such tautology occurs if one compounds inferences from behaviour into the analysis, which amalgamates the dependent and the independent variable.[12] This is precisely why the empirical analysis concentrates on primary rather than secondary sources, as the latter mostly describe certain behaviours of the two organizations. Put differently, in order to avoid such inference I study normative, ideational, and behavioural components of security cultures rather than the behaviour of those organizations. As noted, these attitudinal structures are expressed by the political elite in the form of strategic documents like a security strategy (in the case of the EU)[13] or the strategic concept (in the case of NATO). Put simply, we will examine written rhetoric expressed in strategic documents.[14]

Studying elite expressions of values, norms, and beliefs of national security has a number of advantages. To start with, elite political cultures are easier to describe and measure[15] than, for example, public opinion polls, which are usually too elaborative to reveal specific underlying cultural mindsets on security issues. Second, attitudinal structures held by elite policy makers are assumed to possess sophisticated political belief systems that are more coherent than those of ordinary individuals.[16] Third, those elites hold primary responsibility for formulating the security policies of the organizations in question, and thus show a great deal of influence in key decisions on values, beliefs, and norms of international security.

I rely on the interpretive variant of the content analysis method[17] to gain access to the attitudinal structures of those organizations' strategic cultures while being fully aware that such a narrow analysis can only provide a snapshot picture in a specific given time and of a potentially much larger trend.[18] Hence, there is no claim for comprehensiveness in this study; nor is the claim made that the two organizations' cultures have developed over time. I am particularly interested in three clusters (or categories) of normative attitudes: 1. the nature and interpretation of threats, 2. accepted ways and methods to address these threats, and 3. values attached to international organizations.[19] The first examines the extent and degree to which threats endanger social agents, as well as the ways in which they are interpreted and used to justify security behaviour. The second category of normative attitudes focuses

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on accepted social practices regarding how to address these threats, including the application of civilian and military resources of state power. What are the organizations' attitudes towards the use of force? Under which conditions, if at all, should it be used? The final category examines the values that both the EU and NATO attach to international cooperation and international law, and how such practices, if at all, should be conditioned by international rules and norms.

It should, however, be noted that there is an imbalance in comparing the EU and NATO's security strategy. One major difference, of course, is their size and thus the scope and extent of detailing they provide. The NATO document is much more extensive and elaborative than its European counterpart. A second difference is that both strategies can only be seen as the lowest common denominator of the national security values and beliefs held by the member states.[20] For example, most of the EU member states as well as Canada and the United States maintain a national security strategy – and thus a national strategic culture – that should be noted as an addition to the EU strategy.

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Concepts

The Strategic Culture Concept

Reviewing the history as well as the ontological underpinnings of the strategic culture concept helps us to appreciate the origins and theoretical refinements of this approach over time. The literature, broadly speaking, clusters the scholarship on strategic cultures into four 'generations'.[21] Haglund, Norheim-Martinsen, and Rynning superbly discussed the first three in the theoretical section earlier in this volume; thus there is no need for me to repeat the historical evolution of the concept here, nor to trace the evolution of the literature in each of the three generations. Rather, I simply state that this paper builds on the fourth generation's scholarship of sociological studies of strategic cultures. Specifically, it provides a comparative analysis of strategic cultures and attempts to tease out hidden cultural logics.[22]

This scholarship began to emerge in the early 1990s and questioned the ontological assumptions of the earlier generations. Inspired by the evolving constructivist school of international relations, scholars began to theorize about identity formations and norms that were shaped by the interplay of history, tradition, and culture. A strategic culture was conceived as an independent or intervening variable that affects the security behaviour of social agents.[23] It is conceived as a metaconcept that goes beyond representing a singular process of cause and effect, reflects a national identity ('who we are') and normatively informs 'what it is that we do' or 'should do'.[24] Above all, constructivists held that national identities and interests were not a by-product of the international system; they are socially constructed and shaped by practices of interaction among social actors.

Following this line of thinking implies two things: first, societies rather than external structures shape and define the identities, interests, and capacities of social agents. Second, societies contain normative elements that require interpretation and understanding.[25] Social actors reproduce norms and structure by reflexively

basing their actions on their acquired knowledge, habits, and routines.[26] Transmitted to the domain of security studies, strategic culture approaches charge that individual state interests are constructed in the 'patterns of perceptions about a country's role in international politics as well as in the use of military force towards achieving political ends'.[27] It is precisely in this sense that strategic cultures are able to provide an insight into the 'reasons' behind international agents' actions.[28] In short, constructivism has enabled scholars to examine more closely the cultural and social contexts in which international actors operate.

Norms

Definitions of strategic cultures, as David Haglund's essay in this volume reminds us, are diffuse and inconsistently used in the literature. One way of operationalizing them, however, is to unpack the expression of a strategic culture into normative, ideational, and behavioural components. Put differently, this is to say that normative structures are part of a state's strategic culture. This in turn implies that their analysis can provide meanings of the two organizations' social reality. Norms are defined as 'intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action'.[29] They are social facts that set standards of appropriate behaviour, express the agents' identities, and in this sense have a prescriptive element regarding how things ought to be in the world.[30] Norms also help social agents to situate themselves in relation to other social actors, and to interpret these actors' interests and actions.[31]

Cultural studies have shown that in contrast to material conditions, norms are the least volatile components of a political and thus strategic culture.[32] They are deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour for social agents.[33] This, in turn, implies two things: first, a strategic culture is unique to each organization; second, because of their complex and interrelated integral components, they could not be replicated elsewhere. Also, as John Duffield has found, they are resistant towards change precisely because they are widely shared among societal groups, whereas competitive proposals still have to convince a critical societal mass.[34] The second reason why strategic cultures are difficult to change is because it is generally difficult to establish the falsity of a claim, norm, or value. Only dramatic historical events or traumatic national experiences can function as a catalyst for changing strategic cultures.[35] However, even in those exceptional circumstances, states are most likely to rely on a pre-existing *Weltanschauung* (national world views) as guidance for their security behaviour(s).

The Nexus Between a Strategic Document and a Strategic Culture

John Duffield has found that institutional sources of normative predispositions of security are 'likely to reside in the central government organs charged with the formulation and execution of policy'.[36] Political elites, he argues, are the primary holders of such normative structures, and embody a 'negotiated reality' of societal predispositions. In that sense, political elites function as the gatekeepers of societal norms, beliefs and values regarding national security issues. They aggregate and then replicate them back into society.

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Political scientists defined elites as those 'who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics'.[37] While being the 'spokespersons' of individual members of society, they function as an aggregate panel that accumulates diverse sets of norms, beliefs, and values of civil society on issues related to national security. Those elites hold the expertise to aggregate those norms and then 'process' and 'translate' them for society by means of a publicly accessible language. In so doing, elites 'homogenize' norms that are vaguely expressed and shared by members of society, and make them available and understandable. This process of norm aggregation and expression is completed by engaging in political discourses such as writing policy documents like white papers, policy memos, or security strategies. In turn, because a national security strategy is rooted in the beliefs, attitudes, and value systems of society as well as in societal interpretations of social reality[38] the European Union's Security Strategy (ESS) and NATO's new strategic document can both be conceptualized as outcomes of the bargaining and negotiation processes of nationally held strategic beliefs, values, norms and ideas of security.[39] Specifically, those two documents outline elite normative predispositions about the values and meanings assigned to security threats and scenarios, including broadly cast justifications for government action and practices. As Neumann and Henrikki remind us, security documents converse about fundamental philosophical questions of the meanings of life and the relationships between the self and others.[40] It is in this sense that strategic documents contain information about the processes by which social actors learn from their peers. They also show a relational component to other social actors as well as a dynamic interplay between discourse and practice defined as socially recognized forms of activity and learning.[41] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikking remind us that '[w]e only know what is appropriate by reference to the judgments of a community or society.'[42]

To be sure, strategic guidance papers like the European Security Strategy or the NATO strategic document are elite political documents that aim to provide normative and evaluative signposts for social actors on a range of issues, including transnational risks and threats, strategies, and concepts. They prescribe behavioural attitudes and activities, and often are designed to either create or maintain political unity among its constituent parts. This is particularly true for the EU and NATO. Strategic documents thus serve three functions: 1. they express an elite consensus held by the respective member states on issues of security and defence; 2. they provide a basis for planning and guiding military and non-military activities in international politics; and finally, 3. because they determine relations to other social actors, they can be perceived as an instrument of public policy.

Empirical Evidence

Using Alexander Wendt's definition of norms from above, this section discusses and compares the intersubjective beliefs that the European Union and NATO hold about the social and natural world in terms of anticipated threats and challenges, mandates, and roles of third parties and international organizations.

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Interpretation and Meanings of Future Challenges and Threats

In the European Security Strategy, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are listed as 'potentially the greatest threat to our security'[43]. Other threats are believed to stem from regional conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean;[44] failed and failing states (such as Somalia and Afghanistan);[45] and organized crime in the form of cross-border trafficking of drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons, or more recently piracy.[46] This laundry list of threats was augmented in the 2008 document by soft security issues like energy security, cyber security, and climate change. Such an extensive list of potential threats provides a strong indication that the new security environment is believed to be populated by military *and* non-military threats.

It is important to note, however, that the European Security Strategy identified terrorism as a strategic threat.[47] It is recognized as a complex phenomenon that is ingrained in European societies and has multiple causes: '... These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crisis, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.'[48] Thus, it is hardly surprising that the ESS deduces global rather than regional solutions from this perception.

Unlike its predecessors in 1999 and 1991, NATO's 2010 strategic document does not envision future 'threat scenarios' or grand threats that the alliance should prepare for. Rather, like the European Security Strategy it lists a broad range of military and non-military threats. The first is conventional force. A number of non-EU countries, for example, are in the process of updating their conventional force capabilities by proliferating ballistic missiles.[49] Second, threats to Euro-Atlantic security continue to result from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their technology, as well as other weapons of mass destruction.[50] Third, terrorism and extremist groups are considered a threat to the security of the alliance. Fourth, regional instabilities and conflicts that are the result of radical extremism, terrorism, or illegal activities like drug trafficking and human smuggling are believed to endanger the security of the alliance. Those sources of conflict often have a transnational character and thus can easily spread beyond national boundaries and into one of the member states. Fifth – and this may come as a surprise to some NATO observers – allies perceive cyber attacks[51] as a threat that could inflict significant damage on, for example, NATO's collective infrastructure.[52] Explicit listing of this non-military threat is not only a novelty in the history of the alliance; it also reveals the high normative meanings that NATO assigns to non-military threats. Other non-military threats could result from damage to transit ways or communication installations, as well as environmental pollution, climate change, and water scarcity.[53] In sum, NATO's list of threats shows a lack of specificity and thus can be interpreted as a catalogue of global risks rather than genuine security threats.

Behavioural Norms in Response to Threats

The European Security Strategy explicitly expresses a normative aspiration to make the world a better place. This implies an activist interpretation of security.[54] By recalling the norm of fostering pan-European integration, the ESS lays strong meanings on

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Europe as a region and vows to export its success by creating prosperity and peace for the immediate European neighbourhood.[55] This approach has become known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which has created a strong normative framework that guides relations with other social agents.[56] While stability in the rest of the world is important, stability at home in Europe is pivotal and perceived as a precondition for the EU's role as a global actor. It is thus hardly surprising that the ESS does not spend much time discussing how to best project its military capabilities.[57] Above all, the project of European Union integration was inspired by the application of soft rather than hard power. Thus, the EU's behavioural benchmark is the peaceful integration of Europe and the values that have accompanied this process.[58]

The European codes of conduct sanction the use of force, making it permissible only in an act of self-defence.[59] Pre-emptive or preventative military behaviours that are carried out without the explicit endorsement of the UN Security Council are considered illegitimate and prohibited at all times. The use of force is justified in exceptional circumstances only, as the very last resort of European statecraft after all sources of diplomacy and negotiation have been exhausted.[60] Behind these normative principles is a strong aversion to using military force as a means to achieve political objectives.[61] Instead, the EU sees itself as a nation-builder that helps to restore governments and foster democracies in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[62] Those normative predispositions are succinctly constituted by the so-called Petersberg Tasks that inadvertently made the European Union an active global actor in the domains of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and providing humanitarian assistance. In other words, it is precisely these Petersberg principles that provide constitutive norms of accepted behaviour and limit the scope and extent of the EU's role as a global actor.[63]

At the same time, the European Security Strategy acknowledges that the new security environment after 11 September, as well as increasing degrees of globalization, have transformed the ways in which states and organizations respond to threats. The first line of European defence lies no longer at home, but abroad.[64] Such strategic belief highlights the value attached to forward security engagements – that is, addressing threats and risks away from the home territory and before they become a liability at home. Moreover, by positing that 'none of the new threats is purely military' indicates that conflict prevention – that is, preventative rather than reactive engagement – is considered more effective than coercive force in addressing those threats. Transnational conflicts should be addressed by using a range of tools and instruments such as sanctions, export controls or asset freezing, as well as political and economic engagements. Crisis management also requires resources in policing, the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, negotiation and consultation[65] and foreign aid.[66] This implies that the EU considers peace-building and poverty reduction essential approaches to global crisis management. Those behavioural values and beliefs reveal a strong indication that the EU's security elite champions a comprehensive definition of security[67] that is aimed at long-term engagements and lasting stabilization.

Spreading European values of peace, order, and good governance as well as respect for human and humanitarian rights and solidarity are considered complementary normative elements of the EU's global engagement: 'Spreading good

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governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.'[68] Norm violators or states that categorically reject those norms should be partially engaged in international forums rather than being marginalized.

NATO's new strategic document, on the other hand, starts off by mapping out the alliance's particularistic role in 'ensuring our common defence and security' and ensuring that 'the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values'.[69] This gives meaning to the very specific and selective role in the defence of its members' territory and populations that NATO acquired through Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It implies that unlike the European Union, NATO perceives itself as a regionally confined military alliance with a primary reason d'état of ensuring the physical safety of its member states.[70] In addition, NATO envisions its playing an active role in four ways:[71] 1. to provide collective defence by means of defence and deterrence; 2. to be active in crisis management by using its vast array of military and civilian means that can be applied before, during, and after conflicts;[72] 3. to enhance its own security through cooperative security partnerships with other international organizations, regimes and countries; and 4. to engage in crisis and conflict management by employing a mix of political, civilian, and military means.[73] Nonetheless, provision of defence and deterrence are considered the two most pivotal behavioural norms in response to the most imminent threats. The acceptable means by which these mandates are carried out include a mix of highly mobile and robust conventional and nuclear force capabilities.

The Role and Significance of Third Parties and Other International Organizations

In light of the threat perceptions and values attached to security, the ESS assigns a pivotal value to the United Nations' role in managing international peace and security, as well as fostering multilateralism. Indeed, the United Nations stands at the 'apex of the international system', and the European Union has made it a priority to seek a mandate from the Security Council for its actions abroad.[74] International alliances (such as NATO) and strategic partnerships with countries like Canada, China, India, and Japan or regional organizations like ASEAN, SAARS, and the African Union are also assigned vital importance in the EU's role as a global actor. To be sure, the EU's attitudinal structures towards international institutions go beyond and above the security domain and reference, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They reveal a strategic thinking in terms of *interlocking institutions*, which refers to conditions whereby international institutions experience a functional overlap in a rather narrowly defined situational context. Such overlap is evaluated positively as it reinforces a complex set of strategic objectives that cannot be mastered by one organization alone.[75]

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the European Union stresses the value of acting in concert with others as its foremost normative foreign policy principle. Above all, it is believed to be the vehicle that ensures Europe's security and prosperity.[76] Thus multilateralism has become a concept with a strong normative

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connotation in the European Union discourse. It reveals attitudinal structures that see international organizations as independent social actors in international politics that help to: 1. manage global threats and pockets of insecurity; 2. promote security in the EU's neighbourhood; and 3. create an internationally based order of effective multilateralism and cooperation among states that are guided by sources of international law. Put differently, the EU seeks to create a multilateral system of global governance that is based on a rules-based international order and the aspiration to develop a 'stronger international society'.[77]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization perceives itself as a unique community of states that stands for values like freedom, liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. The new strategic document stresses that the alliance is committed to upholding and abiding by the principles laid out in the UN Charter, and accepts the Security Council as the primary institution that upholds international peace and security.[78] This means that the normative spaces provided for the United Nations in both the European Union and NATO's strategic document are nearly identical. Also, both organizations see themselves as holding a global mandate. For its part, NATO pledges to work closely with the UN and perceives its role as subordinate to the UN. It also seeks to expand its network of multilateral contacts[79] by partnering with other international organizations and states like Russia and Australia, believing that this helps NATO to defend and spread its liberal democratic values as well as promoting cooperation, dialogue and mutual respect. The list of potential cooperation partners is non-exhaustive, implying that all states and institutions could potentially be collaborators and partners.

However, the partnership with the European Union is assigned particular importance. The strategic concept notes that '. . . the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO'.[80] Cooperation with the European Union is said to foster security in Europe and around the world, although it is recognized that dialogue between the two institutions is in need of improvement to reduce rivalries and redundancies among their members.[81] This statement, however, is somewhat contradictory to NATO's explicit endorsement of a stronger European security and defence policy under the Lisbon Treaty, because it creates a Union that increasingly competes with NATO in the areas of foreign, security, and defence policy. Thus it is difficult to be convinced that NATO's new strategic concept values a strategic partnership between the two organizations that is based on the principles of complementary and mutual reinforcing roles. More convincing seems the argument that NATO and the European Union stand in competition with one another for resources, influence, and roles abroad. It thus appears that NATO's perception of itself as an autonomous security institution in Europe is less clear than the EU's perception of itself both globally and in relation to NATO. In the EU's mind, NATO is but one organization with which a strategic partnership should be sought. Moreover, its role perceptions in global politics go far beyond NATO's rather limited focus on defence issues. In contrast to NATO, the European Union clearly anticipates a comprehensive global role for itself.

Summary of Empirical Analysis

It is useful at this point to summarize the empirical findings from above. It is remarkable to observe that both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty

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Organization have almost identical normative values and interpretations of future challenges and threats and the role of third parties and international organizations. To be sure, there are nuances in those interpretations and meanings, but they are subtle and, in the grander picture of things and especially with regard to inferring conclusions about the nature of strategic cultures, of little consequence or importance. One of those nuanced differences is, for example, that NATO continues to see conventional forces as a vital threat to its security, whereas the European Union does not even mention such a threat and thus does not assign any meaning to it. Another subtle difference is that NATO aspires to become a 'hub' in international security policy that allows other international organizations and states to functionally coordinate their efforts with those of the alliance. The EU does not envision such a role for itself and its list of organizations with which it wishes to cooperate is slightly more extensive and diversified. To reiterate, these are subtle rather than obvious inconsistencies of normative predispositions.

One stark difference in the attitudinal structures of the two organizations, however, appears when comparing the two organizations' behavioural norms in response to future challenges and threats. Here, we speak not of nuanced but rather of elementary normative differences, especially in terms of the values attached to the use of force, the sanctioned type and range of missions, and the sets of resources justified to employ them. On the EU side, the list of threats reveals a comprehensive definition of security that allows the application of a wide range of resources by way of combining military and civilian assets for global crisis management operations, including foreign aid and economic assistance, as well as strengthening capabilities in areas such as policing, the rule of law, or security sector reform. The first line of European Union defence and security is allegedly abroad, and halting potential conflicts before they can become a vital security threat to its member states becomes a primary policy objective. In other words, the European Union believes that global conflicts are pertinent and require an activist interpretation of security as well as a whole range of government resources to address them, including economic assistance and foreign aid.[82]

The EU's role as a global actor is further defined and guided by the principles laid out in the Petersberg Tasks, which set the types of missions as well as the normative standards by which the EU's engagement in international security affairs is justified. However, by holding the Petersberg tasks as normative benchmarks for its role as a global actor, the European Union demonstrates that it increasingly operates in competition with NATO.[83] In addition, because of its comprehensive line-up of civilian and military capabilities it shows that it is better equipped and resourced to address the modern security threats. By making use of the Berlin-Plus agreement and gaining assured access to NATO's military assets, the European Union is now at least partially able to functionally replace NATO militarily and push back NATO's role in areas where the EU holds expertise and a comparative advantage.[84] The European Union therefore expresses not only cooperative but also competitive traits that directly compete with those of NATO.

NATO, on the other hand, has a much more regionally confined mandate, which is to provide collective defence for its member states. Its first line of defence is at home,

and thus it has a very particularistic role in international security governance. Its raison d'état precisely results from maintaining the relevance of Article 5.[85] While the alliance aspires eventually to be able to concurrently deploy civilian and military resources in its operations, it clearly lacks such civilian capabilities at this moment in time.[86] Only the European Union maintains comprehensive assets that could potentially augment NATO's superior military capabilities. It can be said therefore that NATO needs a 'Berlin-Plus in reverse' agreement to fulfil its civilian responsibilities. In short, NATO defines itself as a regionally confined military alliance that provides collective defence for its member states. In contrast, the EU foresees a broader and more active role for itself in international security affairs that goes far beyond military engagements.

How to Interpret such Normative Overlap and Divergence?

While these empirical findings may be satisfactory to some, they nonetheless call for further explanation and analysis. How can we explain such attitudinal overlapping of two security organizations in Europe?[87]

One way to conceptually explain such attitudinal overlap and divergence is to conceive the EU's strategic culture as a set of sufficiently shared norms among all European Union member states. In this sense, EU norms are the least common and contentious denominator of the belief systems held EU-wide. Defining the EU's strategic culture in this way leaves out all those controversial attitudes and issues in which there is no EU-wide agreement. This is a reasonable expectation given that 21 of NATO's 28 members are concurrent members of the EU. However, while this may appear to be a convincing proposition at first sight, it does not explain the variation of attitudinal structures with regard to the behavioural norms in response to threats as discussed above.

Instead, I suggest that a more convincing, yet still preliminary and exploratory, conceptual argument to explain this cultural overlap as well as the empirical findings above is to cast the European Union and NATO's strategic cultures in terms of a subcultural relationship. Because of its rather limited and regionally focused scope of providing collective security in Europe, NATO's strategic culture can be seen as a subculture of the EU's strategic culture.

The concept of subculture is not novel in the social sciences and humanities. It helps us to map the social world and to make sense of social behaviours.[88] In the most general terms, a subculture is an explanatory device that refers to a subset of cultural traits or a group of social actors that share distinctive sets of values, beliefs, norms, and behaviours that differ from those held by the larger society or group.[89] In this sense, members of subcultures are parts of the mainstream society that have developed unique beliefs, norms, and values and associate with one another more personally than with members of other groups,[90] and are an analytical and descriptive vehicle through which to explain social actions and change.

Alfred Lee is credited with the first use of the term in the field of sociology and anthropology.[91] Inspired by sociological thinking about cultures, the concept of subcultures was introduced into the field of political science by Gabriel Almond and

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Sidney Verba in their seminal work on comparative political cultures.[92] It is used as an analytical framework to study patterns of political cultures and to describe persistent and significant differences in political or organizational orientations. A group of individuals in society may, for example, be oriented towards pursuing a particular set of political objectives and outputs but remain positively oriented towards the existing political structure.

Such conceptualization of subcultural relations holds some currency for our case study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union. In particular, the two organizations' attitudinal and normative divergence of envisioned missions and mandates could be explained by a particular set of subcultural (NATO) values and attitudes that are part of a much broader EU strategic culture.[93] More precisely, the EU's normative predispositions and attitudinal structures provide the broader cultural and normative frame of which NATO's strategic culture has become part. From the empirical discussion above, it is also apparent that NATO's strategic culture is more particularistic and narrower than the EU's. For example, many conflicts and crises increasingly require the use of civilian crisis management capabilities as well as a combination of diplomatic and economic instruments and resources. The application of the so-called 3D concept in Afghanistan has in particular shown that the military component of the commitment is only one of many. Afghanistan also showed the limitations that a military alliance can encounter in a multidimensional conflict. In strategic culture terms, narrow military strategies have demonstrated the limitations of NATO's engagements in Afghanistan and underlined the absence of an overarching political strategy. NATO is particularly ill-equipped to apply the full spectrum of civilian crisis management capabilities given the fact that it is a military alliance.[94] It does not possess nor have access to civilian resources to the extent the European Union does. In order to make use of such capabilities, NATO has to ask its European members to provide for such complements. Following this line of thought makes the alliance's strategic culture a subculture within the EU's strategic culture – that is, an integral yet subordinate part of the EU's strategic culture – while maintaining an orientation towards the dominant European Union culture. In that sense, as Komarovsky and Sargent remind us, subcultures 'constitute relatively cohesive social systems. They are worlds within the larger world or our national culture'[95], and provide new resources of identity and difference among international institutions. Above all, it shows that subcultures exercise agency, and were formed within the context of a dominant culture.[96]

In addition, the conceptualization of NATO's strategic culture as a subculture provides the social causation that helps to explain a number of interrelated issues and phenomena: we should understand those arguments as preliminary and exploratory rather than fully developed attempts to explain the cultural overlap of the two institutions. To start with, the conceptualization of NATO as a subcultural entity of a much broader political European culture is consistent with the importance assigned to Article 5 in the new strategic concept. The principle of collective defence continues to be of paramount importance for the alliance (as well as for the development of the EU's foreign policy) precisely because it provides a very focused and limited military role for NATO that ensures the territorial integrity of its member states. This allows

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the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to neglect this collective defence responsibility and to concentrate on other aspects and non-military aspects of security. Put differently, the principle of collective defence remains the core normative responsibility of NATO while, in contrast, the European Union pursues more of a collective security role.[97] Such division of labour in EU security affairs reassures NATO's member states that the alliance is primarily an inward-looking organization with a regional rather than a global mandate. It also portrays NATO as a non-threatening organization in the European Union security environment.[98]

Second, critics may point out that one of NATO's most central objectives is to provide a political forum that facilitates policy exchange and debates across the Atlantic. While such portrayal is undoubtedly true, it does not conflict with the subcultural model. Above all, it is wrong to assume that NATO represents the full embodiment of European Union-American relations. This relationship extends far beyond the military domain and covers issues in domains such as energy, business, culture, justice, and health.[99] In other words, the domain of security is only a small component of a much more broad and extensive European Union-American relationship.

Third, a subcultural relationship between the European Union and NATO helps to explain why the European Union sees conflict and tension with Russia beyond the security and defence domain. More specifically, the European Union perceives the challenges resulting from Central and Eastern Europe in the framework of a neighbourhood policy (ENP). The fact that Russia's distrust of NATO has not, interestingly enough, hampered its relations with the EU implies that 'the EU clearly provides a security policy agenda that Russia regards as more pragmatic and less confrontational than NATO's'.[100] In other words, the EU is seen as an international actor with which Russia shares more preferences than it does with NATO.[101]

Fourth, building on the analysis of the EU's crisis management operations since 2003 (for discussion see earlier essays in this volume), it is apparent that the European Union runs twice as many civilian than military operations. This underlines not only the EU's predisposition towards civilian crisis management capabilities but also its value judgments and commitment to managing such crises. More specifically, out of the total 24 operations deployed by the EU so far, only 7.5, or 31.2 per cent, were of a military nature.[102] The vast majority of those missions (16.5, or 68.7 per cent) can be counted as civilian operations. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that only a very small fraction of those 7.5 military operations made use of the Berlin-Plus arrangements. Operation Concordia in Macedonia was the first ever mission that took place under the Berlin-Plus banner, followed by Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Above all, it is noteworthy that the EU's operations are of small scale and usually follow those conducted by NATO. An example of this is Operation Althea which, as Charles Pentland noted in his article, continues to pursue the objectives set by its predecessor NATO, primarily in the areas of deterring threats to security and the population, security sector reform, police training, and fighting organized crime. This supports the subcultural conception of the relationship between the European Union and NATO, especially as the latter organization pursues a much more particularistic role in international crisis management.

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Conclusion

This article examined the ideational structures of the European Union and NATO that affect both institutions' social behaviour (and their behaviour towards each other). The analysis was inspired by constructivist scholarship on strategic cultures, which were conceptualized as an elite expression of strategic beliefs, values, and norms. Norms were defined as 'intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world'. The aim of the research article was to tease out how structures of meaning in the form of norms, values, and beliefs have affected those two organizations' behaviour towards each other. In order to gain access to the EU and NATO's attitudinal structures in the empirical section, their strategic cultures were unpacked into normative, ideational, and behavioural components and clustered according to 1. the meanings they assign to future challenges and threats; 2. the behavioural prepositions of how to respond to those threats; and 3. the preferred modes of international cooperation.

I argued that there is a significant overlap between the two institutions' attitudinal structures, especially with regard to the meanings and values they attach to future threats and the role of third parties and other international organizations. I also argued that there exists an elementary cultural difference in terms of the values attached to the use of force, the sanctioned range and type of missions, and the resources justified to carry them out. The ongoing NATO air strikes against the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi are a case in point where NATO and not the European Union was able to agree on a military campaign.

I then started to explore a conceptual argument that could explain the attitudinal divergence of the two institutions, proposing to conceptualize NATO's strategic culture as a subculture of the EU's strategic culture. That is to say that NATO's strategic culture has acquired a subcultural trait of shared and distinctive sets of values, norms, and beliefs that are different from those held at the European Union level. Generally speaking, a subculture is an explanatory device that refers to social actors that share distinctive sets of values, beliefs, norms, and behaviours that differ from those held by the larger society or group. With this logic applied to the EU-NATO relationship, I showed that while NATO's strategic culture assigns the highest value to the principle of collective defence (Article 5), the EU's attitudinal structures are much broader and resemble a thinking of collective security. To be sure, this conceptualization of a subcultural relationship between the European Union and NATO should be seen as a provisional exploratory argument that could potentially allow us a more in-depth view of the inter-institutional relationship between the two most pivotal security organizations in Europe, going beyond their shared and contested material capabilities and assets. At the same time, I am aware that such argument cannot be fully developed here due to space limitations, and thus should be understood as an attempt to explore an alternative conceptual explanation. It should also be noted that the empirical section was only able to provide a snapshot of potentially larger ideational forces at play, which undoubtedly poses the limitations of this analysis.

However, as the literature on strategic culture reminds us, in comparison to material conditions, political cultures are rather stable.[103] They change only very

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slowly, and usually after experiencing seminal historical events that have an enduring effect on societies. Put differently, political cultures change very slowly, if at all, and such alteration will take place under the condition of dramatic national events that require nationally held beliefs, values, and norms to be revisited, such as the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia that left most European countries helplessly watching history unfold without having the physical capability, readiness, or ability to intervene. Such events had a lasting effect on the development of attitudinal structures of the EU as well as NATO and their overlapping roles in international crisis management. Against this historical perspective, it seems unlikely that other seminal historical events will unfold in the near future that could potentially alter the security strategies of the two organizations.

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NOTES

1. Asle Toje, 'The EU, NATO and European Defence: A Slow Train Coming', Occasional Paper, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008.
2. This literature is vast. See, for example, Hans-Christian Hagman, *European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bernhard May, May-Britt Stumbaum, and German Council on Foreign Relations (eds), *NATO versus EU?: Security Strategies for Europe* (Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations, 2005); Antonio Missiroli, 'EU–NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2002), pp. 9–26; Sten Rynning, 'Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), pp. 52–72; David S. Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, vol. 3, Forum Paper (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007).
3. See, for example, 'Sharing (Which?) NATO Burdens', *The New York Times*, 16 June 1988, A26; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War*, 1st edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Christopher Coker, *Shifting into Neutral?: Burden Sharing in the Western Alliance in the 1990's*, 1st edn (London and Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990); Rosemary Fiscarelli, 'Europe is Grabbing The Spoils of Peace', *The New York Times*, 9 March 1990; Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala, *The US, NATO and Military Burden-sharing* (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Michael R. Gordon, 'U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back', *The New York Times*, 14 December 1989, A23; Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1987); Josef Joffe, 'The Trans-Atlantic Numbers Game', *The New York Times*, 18 May 1988, A31.
4. G. Wyn Rees, *The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a Global Agenda* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5. Jean-Yves Haine, 'From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence. Core Documents Volume III', Chaillot Paper, EU-ISS, Paris, 2003, especially pp. 178–180.
6. Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler (eds), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Martin Reichard, *The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
7. See House of Commons of the United Kingdom Defence Committee, 'The Future of NATO and European Defence: Ninth Report of Session 2007–08', (London: Stationery Office); M.I. Clausson (ed.), *NATO: Status, Relations, and Decision-Making* (New York: Novinka Books, 2007); *NATO–EU Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, NDC Occasional Paper No. 15, NATO Defense

College, Rome, 2006; Atlantic Council of the United States, 'Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO–EU Security Architecture', Policy Paper, Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, DC, 2006; Centre for European Reform, *A European Way of War* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004).

8. See Stephanie C. Hofmann, 'Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49, No. 1 (2010), pp. 101–120.
9. In studying these two security strategies and not the policies and practices surrounding or following them, it is acknowledged that this approach inevitably sets the limitations of this essay. However, space limitations do not allow a detailed examination of the two organizations' security policies and practices over time. We will also refrain from analysing the behaviour of states as it risks producing tautological arguments as to how strategic culture has influenced the behaviour of states or groups of states.
10. I hereby indirectly acknowledge that NATO had established the dominant security culture in the Cold War – qua practice so to speak – and the emergence of an autonomous European Union in the 1990s has questioned and altered this situation.
11. The purpose here is not to make a historical argument nor to show how their respective strategic cultures have evolved over time.
12. The danger of tautological inference is explicitly noted, for example, in Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 30–31; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 50; Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 328; Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 26–27; Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 30.
13. In the case of the EU, I will also include a 2008 Report by the European Council on the implementation of the ESS, which is an update of the 2004 ESS.
14. For a related approach see Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2007), pp. 35–66.
15. John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 33.
16. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (note 12), p. 43; Robert D. Putnam, 'Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of "Ideology"', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1971), p. 652.
17. Some have called this approach 'discourse analysis'.
18. I very much acknowledge here that NATO of the 1990s and NATO in the 2000s are very much different organizations. Indeed, NATO has undergone a significant process of internal transformation, and also adapted to the new situational environment that presented itself. However, space limitations here do not allow me to fully discuss and engage in such long-term trend analysis – that is, changes of strategic cultures over time.
19. Inspiration for these clusters came from Christoph Meyer, 'Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), pp. 523–549.
20. Indeed, I assume that both the EU and NATO are sovereign and autonomous social actors that act independently of their member states. A counterargument is provided by Peter Schmidt in this volume.
21. It should be noted though that not all scholars agree with this clustering. For a different approach see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 5–22.
22. This point was made by Sarah M. Corse and Marian A. Robinson, 'Cross-cultural Measurement and New Conceptions of Culture: Measuring Cultural Capacities in Japanese and American Preschools', *Poetics*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), pp. 313–325.
23. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 15); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Colin Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49–69; Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

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24. Ronald L. Jepperson and Ann Swidler, 'What Properties of Culture do we Measure?' *Poetics*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), p. 360.
25. John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neo-realist Synthesis', *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1983), pp. 261–285. John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 855–885.
26. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). To be sure, constructivists do not negate the influence that material factors can have on social actions.
27. Iver B. Newmann and Hennikki Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, Nos. 5–23 (2005), p. 6.
28. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 15.
29. Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 73–74. I am fully aware that the literature further delineates between constitutive and regulative norms. This distinction, however, is not relevant here. For a discussion see John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 28.
30. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security* (note 23), p. 19; see also Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (note 28), p. 22; Audie Klotz, 'Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa', *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 451–478; Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), p. 892.
31. However, this paper's purpose is not to discuss the norm evolutions of those two organizations. Consequently, I will not analyse the processes of 'norm emergence', 'norm cascade', and 'norm internalization' as described by Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics' (note 30), pp. 887–917.
32. See David Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1979), p. 130; Lucian W. Pye, 'Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture', in Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean (eds), *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 65–67.
33. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', (note 12), p. 329; Harry Eckstein, 'Culturalist Theory of Political Change', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 3 (1998), p. 790.
34. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 15), p. 24.
35. *Ibid.* An alternative proposition was put forward by Legro, who noted that bureaucratic organizational cultures could influence the strategic culture of states. See Jeffrey Legro, 'Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (1996), p. 120.
36. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 15), p. 29.
37. Putnam, 'Studying Elite Political Culture' (note 16), p. 651.
38. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 15), p. 23; see also Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan' (note 12); Elkins and Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of Its Effect' (note 32). This point, however, is debated in the literature. While Meyer finds that a EU security culture is emerging, Giegerich disagrees with such an assessment. See Bastian Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). I acknowledge that there are methodological inconsistencies in comparing two state-based security strategies with that of a supranational organization. However, since the making of Europe's foreign and defence policy still remains highly intergovernmental as opposed to supranational, this approach appears to be justified.
39. It is in this sense that my conceptualization of culture is inherently interactionist and provides the means through which actors construct meanings in given situations.
40. Iver B. Neumann and Hennikki Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice' (note 27), p. 7.
41. Barry Barnes, 'Practice as Collective Action', in Theodore R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 19.
42. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', (note 30), pp. 891–892.

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43. European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy’, (Brussels: European Council, 2003) p. 3.
44. *Ibid.* pp. 3–4, 7; European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World’, S407/08(2008), p. 1.
45. European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 4.
46. *Ibid.* p. 4. For a discussion of this see Jolyon Howorth, ‘Beyond NATO? The European Security and Defence Project’, in John Baylis and Jon Roper (eds), *The United States and Europe: Beyond the Neo-Conservative Divide?*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 117–118.
47. Nicole Gnesotto, *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p. 26.
48. European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 4; European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44).
49. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept: For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2010), points 7 and 8. The obvious countries are Iran and North Korea.
50. *Ibid.*, point 9.
51. RAND has warned NATO about this threat for nearly a decade. See F. Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999); John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeld (eds), *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). See also Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Toward a Closer Digital Alliance’, *SAIS Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (2010), pp. 21–31.
52. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (note 49), point 12.
53. *Ibid.*, points 13 and 15.
54. See also Pascal Vennesson, ‘Europe’s Grand Strategy: The Search for a Postmodern Realism’, in Nicola Casarini and Constanza Musu (eds), *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 18.
55. European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in A Better World’ (note 43), p. 7. For further analysis of this notion see Justin Vaisse, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Chaillot Paper, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2007. On the EU neighbourhood policy see, for example, Vennesson, ‘Europe’s Grand Strategy’ (note 54), pp. 18–19; F. Algieri and Arnold Kammel, ‘In Search of Structure: The EU’s Foreign Policy Strategy against the Background of a Missing Global Order’, *European View*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2008), p. 289; Stefan Gänzle and Alan G. Sens, *The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
56. European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44).
57. The EU also does not defend its moral principles of liberty or democracy with the use of force. See also Christoph Meyer, ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), pp. 523–549.
58. Albert Bressand, ‘Between Kant and Machiavelli: EU Foreign Policy Priorities in the 2010s’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2011), pp. 59–85, pp. 59–85.
59. European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 7.
60. Sven Bernhard Gareis, ‘Sicherheitspolitik zwischen “Mars und Venus”? Die Sicherheitsstrategien der USA und der EU im Vergleich,’ in Johannes Varwick (ed.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU: Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalitaet?* (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Buderich, 2005), p. 88; Kenneth Keulman, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role’, in Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson, and Christina M. Schweiss (eds), *Old Europe, New Security: Evolution for a Complex World* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. 52.
61. This may be explainable by pointing out that the ESS was written in 2003 *in response* to the NSS.
62. European council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (Note 43), p. 9.
63. See, for example, Volker Heise and Peter Schmidt, ‘NATO und EU: Auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft?’, in Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (eds), *Transatlantische Beziehungen: Sicherheit, Wirtschaft, Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, and Kai Oppermann (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005).
64. European Council, ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) (note 43), p. 9.
65. 2385th European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20.XI.2001, Brussels, 19–20 November 2001.
66. European Council, ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (note 44), pp. 4, 9.

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67. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 'The New Security Threats in Europe', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2002), pp. 423–452.
68. European Council, 'European Security Strategy' (ESS) (note 43), p. 10.
69. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (note 49), preface.
70. It should be noted t that NATO's member states from Central and Eastern Europe have pushed the alliance particularly hard for reassurance that self-defence is still the central objective of the alliance. See, for example, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2010); David Yost, 'NATO's Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept', *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp 489–522; 'Fewer Dragons, More Snakes: NATO is About to Adopt a New Strategic Concept. Can it Keep Pace with the Way the World is Changing?', *The Economist*, 11 November 2010; Linas Linkevicius, 'Reset With Russia, but With Reassurance', *The New York Times*, 9 September 2010.
71. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (note 49), preface, point 4 a.–c.
72. However, it needs to be pointed out that NATO is a military alliance that holds very limited civilian crisis management capabilities. See Natalia Touzovskaia, 'EU-NATO Relations: How Close to "Strategic Partnership"?', *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), pp. 235–258.
73. *Ibid.*, points 20–22. NATO's role in civilian crisis management is particularly idealistic as it currently possesses only very limited civilian crisis management capabilities to be deployed.
74. 2385th European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20.XI.2001, Brussels, 19–20 November 2001: 2, 9.
75. NATO's management of the strategic vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is a case in point. For a discussion see Ingo Peters, 'The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the "Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions": Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization', in *OSCE Yearbook 2003* (Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2004); Uwe Nerlich, 'Das Zusammenwirken multilateraler Institutionen: Neue Optionen für kollektive Verteidigung und internationale Friedensmissionen', in Bernard von Plate (ed.), *Europa auf dem Wege zur kollektiven Sicherheit?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994); Michael Cox, 'Whatever Happened to the 'New World Order?', *Critique*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1997), pp. 85–96.
76. 'European Security Strategy' (ESS) (note 43), p. 9.
77. *Ibid*. p. 9.
78. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (note 49), point 2.
79. On the notion of multilateralism as an issue in transatlantic affairs see John van Oudenaren, 'What is Multilateral?', *Policy Review*, Vol. 117, February/March (2003), pp. 33–47; John van Oudenaren, 'Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 120, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–32.
80. North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (note 49), point 32.
81. See Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).
82. Based on the latest OECD data, the EU is the world's leading provider of official development assistance (US$45 billion of a total US$128 billion). See http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=REF_TOTALODA (accessed 2 February 2010).
83. A similar argument was made by Heise and Schmidt, 'NATO und EU' (note 63).
84. See Hans van Santen and Arnout Molenaar, 'EU-NAVO-samenwerking: tijd voor transformatie', *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 62, No. 6 (2008), pp. 343–348.
85. States from CEE in particular insisted on this principle at NATO's Lisbon Summit in 2010.
86. For a greater discussion see Arnold Kammel and Benjamin Zyla, 'Looking for a "Berlin-Plus in Reverse"? NATO in Search of a New Strategic Concept', *Orbis*, Fall (2011), pp. 1–14.
87. This section should be seen as taking exploratory steps to further explain inter-institutional relationships.
88. See, for example, Ken Gelder and Sarah Thornton, *The Subcultures Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 1. The concept has its origins in the fields of sociology and anthropology; elements of it can be found in the classical sociological tradition ranging from Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim to Max Weber and Talcott Parssons.
89. Shyon Baumann, 'Culture and Culture Change,' in Lorne Teppermann and James Curtis (eds), *Principles of Sociology: Canadian Perspectives* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 35–36.
90. To be sure, a subculture should not be confused with countercultures that strongly and vehemently reject dominant societal beliefs and norms. For a discussion see J. Milton Yinger, *Countercultures: The Promise*

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and Peril of a World Turned Upside Down (New York: Free Press, 1982); J. Milton Yinger, 'Contraculture and Subculture,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (1960), pp. 625–635.

91. Alfred McClung Lee, 'Levels of Culture as Levels of Social Generalization,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1945), pp. 125–143. See also M. Gordon, 'The Concept of Sub-culture and its Application', *Social Forces* (1947).
92. Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (note 12), pp. 27–31. For a country-specific application of the concept see, for example, Justin Massie, 'Regional Strategic Subcultures? Canadians and the Use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq', *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 19–48.
93. This, however, is not to say that the EU only holds one subculture; indeed, it can have many and varying subcultures at the same time.
94. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, 'Introduction: Why an EU Perspective on the NATO Strategic Concept Matters', in *What do Europeans want from NATO?* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), p. 7.
95. M. Komarowsky and S. Sargent, 'Research into Subcultural Influences upon Personality,' in S. Sargent and M. Smith, *Culture and Personality* (New York: The Viking Fund, 1949).
96. For a discussion of subcultures emerging from either within or from outside of the context of a dominant culture see David Downes, *The Delinquent Solution: A Study in Subcultural Theory* (London: Routledge, 1966), pp. 8–12.
97. For the notion that the EU should adapt a unique way or war see Centre for European Reform, *A European Way of War* (note 7).
98. For an account of an embryonic division of labour between the EU and NATO see Richard G. Whitman, 'NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 430–451.
99. For an interesting discussion see Rebecca Steffenson, *Managing EU–US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New Transatlantic Agenda* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005); Nikos Kotzias and Petros El Liakouras, *EU–US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Elias G. Carayannis, Dimitris G. Assimakopoulos, and Masayuki Kondo, *Innovation Networks and Knowledge Clusters: Findings and Insights from the US, EU and Japan* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Natividad Fernández Sola and Michael Smith, *Perceptions and Policy in Transatlantic Relations: Prospective Visions from the US and Europe* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009).
100. Teija Tiilikainen, 'The EU, NATO and Russia', in *What do Europeans want from NATO?* (note 94), p. 22.
101. On the notion of preferences see Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), pp. 473–524; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 513–533.
102. This number may appear to be confusing, but the EU's own accounting places the mission in support of the African Union in Darfur as half civilian and half military. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en (accessed 24 March 2011).
103. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', (note 12), p. 326; Legro, *Cooperation under Fire* (note 12), pp. 22–25; Arendt Lijphart, 'The Structure of Inference,' in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), p. 42; Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 3 (1988), p. 792.

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